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vs.
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RODNEY C . ROSE
Defendant and Appellant.

12974

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
The Appellant, Rodney C. Rose, appeals

from his conviction of SALE OF A STIMULANT
DRUG, to-wit:

of

§

58-33-6

Methamphetamine, in violation
(1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953,

upon a trial to the court sitting without a

jury, in the Second Judicial District Court
of Weber County, State of Utah.

The Honor-

able John F. Wahlquist presiding.
DISPOSITION IN LONER COURT
The appellant was charged by Complaint
(1)

on the 7th day of May, 1971, with the crime
of sale of a Stimulant Drug, to-wit:

phetamines.

Metham-

Preliminay hearing was held on

the 8th day of October, 1971, and the court
after amending the complaint to conform to
the evidence, bound the defendant over to
stand trial in the District Court.

The ap-

pellant was charged by information in the
District Court with the crime of sale of a
stimulant drug, and trial was held before
the court without a jury on the 13th day of
April, 1972.

The court found the appellant

guilty as charged and sentenced to serve a
term in the Utah State Prison for not less
than one nor more than ten years.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant respectfully requests
~is

Honorable Court to reverse the judg-

ment of the Lower Court and remand the
matter to the District Court for a new
t.rial.
( 2)

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant was charged by Complaint
on the 7th of May, 1971, with the offense
of sell of a stimulant drug, to-wit:
amphetamine.

(Tr-1}

Meth-

Preliminary hearing

was held on October 8, 1971, and following
the testimony of the State's witnesses the
attorney for the State made a Motion To
Amend the Complaint to read "amphetamine"
instead of "methamphetamine."

(Tr-11)

Counsel for the defendant objected to the
amendment but the Court overruled the objection and ordered the Complaint amended
and the defendant bound over to District
Court to stand trial.

(Tr-2)

For some reason unknown to this writer
the District Attorney filed his information
alleging the sell of metharnphetamine as
opposed to amphetamine.

(Tr-14)

The de-

fendant entered a plea of "NOT GUILTY" to
the information charging him with sell of
( 3)

--a stimulant drug, to-wit:
mine.

methampheta-

Trial was held before the Honorable

John F. Wahlquist without a jury on the
13th day of April, 1972.

At the conclusion

of the case the Judge pronounced his verdiet as follows:

"The Court finds the

defendant guilty as charged."

(Tr-182)

POINT I

THE STATE FAILED TO CHARGE OR PROVE THAT
THE ACTS ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN COMMITED BY
THE APPELLANT WERE IN VIOLATION OF UTAH
LAl'fS.
The appellant was charged under the
"Drug Abuse Control Law"

Title 58-33-6 (1),

Utah Code Annotated 1953, with the sell of
a stimulant drug, to-wit:

methamphetamine.

After reviewing the "Drug Abuse Control
Law" this writer was unable to find any
section of that law that defined methamphetamine as being a depressant, stimulant
or hallucinogenic drug, nor was I able to
locate any portion of that law that prohibited
the sell of methamphetamine.

(4)

under §58-33-1
Annotated 1953,

(d)

(2), Utah Code

(Definitions) the Code

does define dl-methamphetamine as being
a depressant, stimulant or hallucinogenic
drug, however, there was no evidence before
the Court that "dl-methamphetamine" and
"methamphetamine" are the same substance.
In a criminal prosecution the State
has the burden of proving all elements of
the alleged offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. §77-31-4 Utah Code Annotated 1953.
In this case the State accused the appellant of an act which it contends is illegal.

The only way the State could meet

its burden of proof would be to show by
competent evidence that methamphetamine
and dl-methamphetamine are the same substance.
One of the witnesses called by the
State was Stanley Merrett, a Utah State
Toxologist (Tr-133).

If anyone could have

clarified this question, Mr. Merrett could,
( 5)

but the State in no way attempted to meet
its burden of proof on one of the more
critical elements of a violation of law.

By analogy, if a person were to be
charged with the offense of sell of a stimulant drug, to-wit:

methodism; it might

be assumed that methodism is some form of
a drug that generally goes by a different
name, and at trial the State might be able
to prove the two to be the same.

However,

at trial if the State merely proves that
methodism may be stimulating, but cannot
prove it is a drug, then the State has
failed to meet its burden.
The net result is that the appellant
now stands convicted of an offense which
the Legislature has not defined as a crime,
and this Court has a duty to rectify the
situation.
POINT II
TEE

COURT ERRED BY CONVICTING THE APPELLANT

WHEN THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT THE STATE'S
(6)

ALLEGATIONS.
The appellant was charged by information with the crime of Sell of a Stimulant Drug, to-wit:

Methamphetamine.

The

only evidence presented at trial as to the
nature of the substance in question was
that testimony given by Stanley Marrett,
a Toxologist.

(Tr-133 to 139)

Through Mr.

Morrett's testimony it is very clear that
the substance in question was NOT methamphetamine.

Mr. Merrett ran two tests on

the substance (1) ultra violet spectrophotometry and

(2) gas chromatography.

(Tr-135)

He testified that the gas chromatography
test which he ran distinguishes amphetamine from methamphetamine, and that the
substance he tested was amphetamine and
not methamphetamine.

(Tr-136)

We contend that the subject matter
or object of the act is crux the of the
charge and must be proven.

(7)

If it is not,

prior decisions of that Court they did
acknowledge the rule of law we are concerned with, as follows:
"This Court has held that if
a person is found guilty of an
offense that is not charged in
the indictment, the verdict is
contrary to law. McGuire v. State
(1875) 50 Ind. 284; Thelge v.
State (1882) 83 Ind. 126.", at
page 650.
In State v. Jordan, 37 S.E. 2d 111,
(N.E. 1946), the appellant had been charged

with the offense of Burglary in the 1st
Degree, but he was actually tried on Burglary in the 2nd Degree, and found guilty
of Burglary in the 1st Degree.

In revers-

ing the held as follows; at page 112:
" ... but it would seem to be
without precedent to try a defendant for one offense and to
convict him of another and greater offense, even though the conviction be of a higher degree
of the same offense for which
he is being tried."
Inasmuch as I was appointed on Appeal,
after trial, I do not have benefit of trial
counsel's thinking on this point.
( 9)

But it

appears that there may have been a mistake in charging the offense.

If that

is the case, it would seem that §77-31-

19, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, should
require that the case be remanded for
re-charging, and a new trial.

I acknow-

ledge that §77-31-19 deals with those
cases where the mistake is discovered
before verdict or judgment, but the same
logic should follow after verdict and
judgment.
In any event this appellant stands
convicted of the crime of Sell of Methamphetamine and the State's evidence conclusively proves there was never any methamphetamines involved in this incident.
CONCLUSION
If the problems presented on this
appeal seem to have been the result of
mistake, confusion, or misunderstandings,
they may be partially explained by the
fact that the appellant had one attorney

(10)

at preliminary hearing, another at trial,
and a third attorney appointed for the
purpose of appeal.

The State was repre-

sented by the County Attorney's office
through preliminary hearing, and the District Attorney's office handled the trial.
Whatever the cause may be, the judicial
process broke down in this case and the
appellant was improperly convicted.
We respectfully request this Court
to remand this case back to the District
Court for a new trial.
Respectfully Submitted.
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